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The Florida Supreme Court decided about one hundred cases during
the period reported from February 7, 1952 through April 24, 1952. Those
opinions (excluding memorandum decisions and a few others not con-
sidered of sufficient importance to be noted here) found in 55 So.2d 873
to 57 So.2d 736 are herewith reported. In addition five federal cases inter-
pretive of Florida law are included. These were taken from 72 Sup. Ct. 380
to 72 Sup. Ct. 678 (advance sheets from March 15, 1952 to May 1, 1952);
193 F.2d 209 to 195 F.2d 184 (advance sheets from Feb. 18, 1952 to May
5, 1952); and 101 F. Supp. 765 to 103 F. Supp. 577 (advance sheets from
February 25, 1952 to May 5, 1952).
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw. Findings of Railroad and Public Utilities Corn-
mission. The court will not set aside the findings and conclusions of the
Railroad and Public Utilities Commission merely because, on review of the
record, the court might have reached a different conclusion from the evi-
dence. The test is if there was substantial competent evidence legally
sufficient to justify the order challenged.1
Supervisors of the State Beverage Department. In the absence of vested
power or authority in the supervisors of the State Beverage Department
which would indicate legislative intent that they are to be officers of the
State, they are deemed to be cmployees. Such being the case, they may be
discharged by the Director of the State Beverage Department without any
action by the Governor.
2
ARRs'r. Without warrant. "A mission to check on a pair of drunks
is not so urgent as to relieve a deputy sheriff from arminig himself with a
warrant when he proceeds to one's home to make an arrest. ''a
CARRIERS. Certificate of convenience arid necessity. A motor carrier
holding a certificate of convenience and necessity from the Interstate Com-
merce Commission for the purpose of delivering movie film to theaters
petitioned the Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commission for an ad-
ditional certificate to enable him to deliver candy, popcorn, sanitary supplies
and other theatrical accessories to the same theaters. The Commission
refused the certificate on the ground that it was not in the public interest.
*This issue of the Quarterly Synopsis was written by George A. Buchmann, Jr. and
edited by Charlotte J. Barkan.
1. Benton Bros. Filn Exp., Inc. v. Florida R.R. & Pub. Util. Coimnni, 57 So.2d
435 (Fla. 195Z).
2. Schott v. Lynch, 57 So.Zd 656 (Fla. 1952).
3. FLA. STAT. § 901.15 (1949), Alday v. State, 57 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1952).
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The court pointed out that the petition amounted to a request for per-
mission to improve and extend an already existing service without increas-
ing the burden on Florida highways rather than a request for a certificate
for a new service. The order of the Commission was quashed with direc-
tions to enter an appropriate order of extension of the certificate.4
The Florida Railroad & Public Utilities Commission does not have
the power to include in a certificate of public convenience and necessity,
issued to a railroad under statute, restrictions not enumerated by the
statute.'
Responsibility for box cars belonging to other carriers. "When a rail-
road company takes over a box car from another carrier, it takes it as part
of its own equipment and assumes responsibility for its condition."'
CONFLIcT OF LAWS. Foreign decrees: lull faith and credit. As to
matters actually litigated, the valid decree of a foreign country will be given
full faith and credit. It can be overcome only if the moving party can
show new conditions that have arisen or old facts that were not revealed
or considered by the foreign court.A
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Due process. A city ordinance providing for
the punishment of a city official by fine or imprisonment if found guilty of
disobediance by a two-thirds vote of the city council strongly resembles a
bill of attainder. Its operation constitutes a denial of due process and is
invalid.9
Separation of church and state. The corpus of a charitable trust con-
sisted of property, buildings and equipment, including a chapel located in
one of the buildings. All of this property with the exception of the chapel
was to be turned over to the county board of public instruction under the
cy pres doctrine. Sufficient funds of the trust were to be retained to operate
and maintain the chapel. Such operation and maintenance is not in vio-
lation of the constitutional requirement of separation of church and state.10
State School Fund. The State School Fund described in the Constitu-
tion does not refer to land owned by the State Board of Education but to
the proceeds derived from the land. Therefore, this land is not included
in the provision that "the principal of the State School Fund shall remain
sacred and inviolate.""
CONTRACTS. Alterations in construction contract. The law implies an
4. Benton Bros. Film Exp., Inc. v. Florida R.R. & Pub. Util. Conin'n, 57 So.2d
435 (Fla. 1952).
5. FLA. STAT. § 323.26 (1949).
6. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Mack, 57 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1952).
7. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Gary, 57 So.2d 10 (FIa. 1952).
8. Willson v. Willson, 55 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1951).
9. Jones v. Slick, 56 So.2d 459 (Fla. 1952).
10. U.S. Cons'r. AMEND. I, FLA. CoNS. Decl, of Rights § 6, Fenste v. Codding-
ton, 57 So.2d -152 (Fa. 1952).
11. Fi.. CONST. Art. XII, § 4, State ex rel. Board of Sup'rs of So. Fla. Conservancy
Dist. v. Warren, 57 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1952).
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obligation on the part of a party to a building contract to pay for requested
alterations or "extras" not considered in the original contract. 12
Damages arising fronz misrepresentation of injured party. An agreement
under which a county was to move a building from a proposed roadway does
not place it under liability for damage to the structure in moving when the
owner misrepresented the type of construction and later refused offers of
the moving contractor to make repairs.'
Employment. Participation by an employee in a group annuity plan
providing for cancellation does not give rise to an implied contract of
employment terminable only for substantial cause when the employee re-
quests and receives a refund of payments and signs a release to the insurer.'
4
Parol evidence. The defendant personally guaranteed the account of
a named company, covering "all materials purchased" from plaintiff by that
company. The word "purchased" is sufficiently ambiguous to permit parol
evidence to explain whether the intent was to include only materials already
purchased, or whether it was to include materials to be purchased in the
future as well."
CORPORATIONS. Instrument executed without corporate seal. It is well
settled law in Florida that a signature by the appropriate officer of a cor-
poration accompanied by the typewritten word "seal" is effective to execute
an instrument tnder seal even though the corporate seal is not affixed. 6
COURTS. Creation of criminal court of record. The legislature may
create a criminal court of record without first requiring the application of
a majority of the registered voters in the county in which the court is
created.' 7
Power of legislature to abolish. Under the Florida Constitution the
legislature can abolish a court in a single named county only by a special
act regardless of whether the court was established by a special or a general
act. 8
CRIMINAL LAw. Conviction based on suspicious circumstances. "... it
takes something more than proof of suspicious circumstances to sustain a
conviction for crime."' 9
Conviction of accessory prior to sentencing of principal. An accessory
to a crime may be convicted if the principal to the crime has been found
guilty even though the principal's sentencing has been deferred.
20
Conviction of parolee followed by revocation of conditional pardon.
12. De Lotte v. Fennell, 56 So.2d 518 (Fla. 1951).
13. Smith v. Manatee County, 56 So.2d 453 (Fla. 1952).
14. Gelhaus v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 194 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1952).
15. Friedman v. Virginia Metal Products Corp., 56 So.2d 5t15 (Fla. 1952).
16. Sarasota Kennel Club, Inc. v. Shea, 56 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1952); Campbell v.
McLaurin Investment Co., 74 Fla. 501, 77 So. 277 (1917).
17. FLA. Cos'r. Art. V, §§ 1, 24, Hanson v. State, 56 So.Zd 129 (Fla. 1952).
18. FLA. CONST. Art. III, §§ 20, 21, Art. V, § 1, State ex rel. Ervin v. Barnes, 56
So.2d 506 (Fla. 1952).
19. Lombardo v. State, 55 So.Zd 914 (Fla. 1951).
20. FLA. SlA'r. § 776.02 (1949), Weathers v. State, 56 So.2d 536 (Fla. 1952).
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While on a conditional pardon after serving part of a fifteen year sentence
a parolee was convicted of a felony and sentenced to serve five years. The
pardon board then revoked his pardon. The court held that the sentences
ran concurrently even though the trial judge failed to so state. The prisoner
does not lose his gain time earned before conviction of the second felony.2'
Homicide. If the evidence discloses that the deceased was a purported
deputy sheriff, without benefit of proper election or appointment, and that
lie was killed while searching the accused's home in the middle of the
night without a warrant, a verdict greater than manslaughter is not justi-
fied.2
Manslaughter. A person subjected to an unlawful attempt to arrest
him in his own home may resist with so much force as is reasonable to
effect his escape. If, in the heat of passion and in the absence of premedi.
tation the person so resisting uses more force than is necessary and kills
the arresting officer, the offense is manslaughter.2 3
Revocation of parole. A parolee who has his conditional pardon re-
voked and allows ten years to pass before asking for a hearing on the revo-
ation order will be deemed to have waived his right to a hearing.24
DAMAGES. Destruction by fire. The measure of damages to be used
when a chattel is completely destroyed by fire is the value of the chattel at
the time of the fire.2
5
Goods lost in hands of receiver. Plaintiff had a contract with defendant
for the purchase of fruit on the defendant's trees. The defendant wrong-
fully refused to allow plaintiff to pick the fruit. Because of the perishable
nature of the fruit a receiver pendente lite was appointed. While the fruit
was in the hands of the receiver it was partially destroyed by freezing
weather. It was found that the plaintiff was the owner of the fruit. The
court recognized the rule that the owner of goods in the hands of a re-
ceiver must suffer any losses incurred but found the rule inapplicable here.
Because the defendant's wrongful act necessitated the receivership it was
held that the measure of damages is the value of the goods at the time of
the wrongful act.20
Punitive damages. A proper element to be considered in assessing puni-
tive damages is the amount which would operate as a punishment of the
defendant with respect to his financial condition. 27
Wrongfld death. "The widow's claim for damages for the death of her
husband by the wrongful act of another is based on the following elements:
(1) Her loss of the comfort, protection, and society of the husband in the
21. FLA. SrAi. §§ 921.16, 954.06 (1949). Mayo v. State ex rel. Cox, 56 So.2d 547
(Fba. 1952).
22. Timmons v. State, 57 So.2d 36 (Fla. 1952).
23. Alday v. State, 57 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1952).
24. Chastain v. Mayo, 56 So.2d 540 (Fla. 1952).
25. First. Nat. Bank in Tarpon Springs v. Bliss, 56 So.2d 922 (H-a. 1952).
26. Fowler v. Smoak, 57 So.2d 429 (Fla. 1952).
27. Maiborne v. Kuntz, 56 So.2d 720 (Fla. 1952).
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light of all the evidence relating to the character, habits, and conduct of the
husband as such. (2) The marital relations between the parties at the time
of and prior to his death. (3) His services, if any, in assisting her in the
care of the family. (4) The loss of support which the husband is legally
bound to give the wife, and which is based on his probable future earnings
and other acquisitions. (5) The station in society which his past history
indicates that he would probably have occupied and his reasonable ex-
pectations in the future, such earnings and acquisitions to be estimated upon
the basis of deceased's age, health, business capacity, habits, experience, and
energy, and his present and future prospects for business success at the time
of his death-all of these elements to be based upon the probable joint lives
of the widow and husband. (6) She is also entitled to compensation for
loss of whatever she might reasonably have expected to receive in the way
of dower or legacies from her husband's estate in case her life expectancy be
greater than his-the sum total of all these elements to be reduced to a
money value, and its present worth to be given as damages.."2
8
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS. Case or controversy. It is the function of a
circuit court to adjudicate the constitutionality of a statute in a declaratory
judgment proceeding brought by a citizen. There need not be a case or
controversy if the movant shows that he is in doubt as to the existence or
non-existence of some right, status, immunity, power or privilege, which
doubt he is entitled to have removed?9
DIVORCE. Bill to set aside decree. A bill in the nature of a bill of re-
view was filed to set aside a divorce allegedly obtained by the husband's
fraud and duplicity. The court held that the suit could not be maintained
after the wife had enjoyed the benefits of the property settlement for three
years.3
0
Custody of children. A divorce decree granted permanent custody of
children to the mother with reasonable visitation privilege to the father. A
subsequent order giving the father the right to have the children visit his
out-of-state home for two months in the summer and requiring the mother
to pay their return fare and relinquish the support money during that time
was held improper, being in effect an order for divided custody without
showing of a change of circumstances since the original decree.31
Foreign divorce not res judicata as to right to Florida divorce. A wife
obtained a Virginia divorce a mensa et thoro on the ground of desertion.
The husband established residence in Florida and sued for a divorce ground-
ed on extreme cruelty and ungovernable temper. The court held that the
Virginia divorce was not res judicata of the husband's right to a Florida
divorce on issues not considered in the Virginia proceeding, but that the
28. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Martin, 56 So.2d 509 (Fla. 1952).
29. Rosenhouse v. 1950 Spring Term Grand Jury, 56 So.2d 445 (Fla. 1952).
30. Jordan v. Jordan, 57 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1952).
31. Kelley v. Kelley, 56 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1952).
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court should retain jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing tie Virginia
decree as to support money should it become necessary.
32
Grounds: Extreme cruelty. A wife, who'was considerably younger than
her husband, brought her ex-husband into their home as a guest. She lodged
the ex-spouse in a bedroom which connected with her own by a door with-
out a lock. She denied her husband the right to enter her bedroom without
permission, Said the court, "This, in my opinion, is the worst form of ex-
treme cruelty that could have been practiced upon the Plaintiff by the
Defendant."
33
Grounds: Habitual intemperance. In reversing a divorce decree the
court pointed out that a husband should not complain of the habitual in-
temperance of his wife if lie kept their home well stocked with liquor and
frequently joined her in excessive drinking.
4
DOMICILE. Intent. The intent to establish a domicile must be a present
intent rather than an intent to establish a home in the future. The fact
that the party was in military service at the time he attempted to establish
residence in Florida and was unable to do so because of the call of duty
does not alter the rule.
3 5
ELECTIONS. Selection of committeemen and delegates to national con-
vention. National committeemen, committeewomen and delegates to a
national convention are party officers and not state officers. Their selection
is a party matter unless controlled or regulated by statute and the courts
have no right, power or authority to exercise any control over the discretion
vested in the state executive committee by statute. :6
EMINENT DOMAIN. Taking before judicial evaluation. Property may be
taken by eminent domain proceedings prior to a jury determination of its
value under a statute3 l7 which provides for a deposit of twice the appraised
value with the court, said appraisal being based on testimony of the parties
and a report of the appraisers. ' 8
EQurrY. Adequate remedy at law. In a proceeding for an accounting,
if the record discloses that the actual relationship of the parties is that of
debtor and creditor rather than of parties to a joint venture the bill should
be dismissed or transferred to the law side of court.
36
Allegations for equitable lien. A bill for an equitable lien must contain
either an allegation of insolvency or an allegation of an inadequate remedy
32. Mellot v. Mellot, 57 So2d 4 (Fla. 1952).
33. Colembeski v. Colembeski, 57 So.2d 654 (Fla, 1952).
34. Todd v. Todd, 56 So.2d 441 (Fla. 1952).
35. Campbell v, Campbell, 57 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1952).
36. FLA. SAr. §§ 103.101(7), 103.121(7) (1949), Alexander v. Booth, 56 So.2d
717 (Fla. 1952).
37. FLA. STAT. c. 74 (1949).
38. FLA. CONS]. Dec. of Rights § 12, Art. XVI, § 29, State Road Dept v. Fore-
hand, 56 So.2d 901 (Fla. 1952).
39. Manning v. Clark, 56 So.2d 521 (Fla. 1951).
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at law, but a bill deficient iii such allegations should not be dismissed with-
out leave to amend. 40
Hearing on bill and answer. In a hearing on bill and answer, after the
time for taking testimony has expired, every answer which is responsive to
an allegation in the bill is taken as true. If the answer denies all of the
material allegations of the bill, the issues are made by the denials and a
final decree should be entered against the party having the burden of
proof' 1
Laches. The father-daughter relationship coupled with a showing of
an inharmonious relationship with the girl's stepmother is sufficient justifi-
cation for a daughter's failure to demand or seek a decree for specific per-
formance of a contract during her father's life. The defenses of laches or
equitable estoppel may not be raised against her when she seeks specific
performance from her deceased father's corporation. 42
Satisfaction of mortgage. If a trial court erroneously fails to order a
satisfaction of a mortgage after it has been established that the notes for
which the mortgage was given are paid, the mortgagor has a right to com-
plain of the error on appeal even though the satisfaction of mortgage was
made subsequent to the entry of a final decree. '-'
Settlement of judgment lien in partition proceedings. In a proceeding
to partition property among sole heirs at law, an equity court can give com-
plete relief by settling the matter of a judgment lien which one of the heirs
had against another heir and which would attach after partition. Then if
it is necessary to sell the property under the decree of the court, the pur-
chaser may obtain title free and clear of the lien.
44
Suit to quiet title on tax deed. If the purchaser of a tax deed allows
a party who was in possession at the time the deed was issued to remain in
possession without bringing an action until four years after the date of the
deed, the purchaser is not entitled to have the title quieted in him as
against the party in possession. 45
EVIDENCE. Admissibility of unsigned letter. An unsigned letter may be
received in evidence if properly connected with a person as being his actual
letter by the introduction of competent evidence showing it to be so.46
Manslaughter. Proof that a defendant was speeding at the time of
an auto accident, without other evidence, is not sufficient to establish tile
culpable negligence requisite for a charge of manslaughter.47
Testimony of handwriting expert. T estimony of handwriting experts
40. Lewinson v. Shaw, 56 So.2d 449 (Fla. 1952).
41. Starlight Corp. v. Miami Beach, 57 S.2d 6 (Fla. 1952).
42. Cottages, Miami Beach, Inc. v. Wegman, 57 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1952).
43. Gordon v. Citizens & So. Nat. Bank of Atlanta. 56 So.2d 531 (Fla. 1952).
44. Burney v. Dedge, 56 So.2d 715 (Fla. 1952).
45. Deas v. Turner, 56 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1952).
46. Silva v. Exchange Nat. Bank of Tampa, 56 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1952) (reported
as 54 So.2d 370 and subsequently withdrawn by order of the court).
47. Preston v, State. 56 So.2d 543 (Fla. 1952).
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alone is sufficient to establish forgery of a will and can properly prevail over
inconsistent and contradictory evidence. 48
EXTRInrrIoN,. Unauthenticated affidavits. If affidavits attached to an
extradition warrant are not authenticated by the governor of the state re-
questing extradition the warrant is fatally defective) 9
FAMLY LAw. Release for adoption. A letter from the unmarried mother
to the adoptive parents requesting them to come for her child coupled with
its delivery to them is sufficient to satisfy the formal requisites for a release
from the mother.50
A formally executed consent agreement by an unmarried expectant
mother for the adoption of her unborn child satisfied the statute' although
she used an assumed name to preserve her anonymity, where her conduct
after the child's birth indicated a ratification of the document. 2
FRAUD. Delay in assertion. " . . . a party injured by fraud must assert
his remedial rights without delay upon becoming aware of the fraud and
after he obtains knowledge of the fraud or has become informed of facts
from which such knowledge would be imputed to him a delay in asserting
his rights constitutes a bar to equitable relief."3
Misrepresentation of credit rating of third party. One who fraudulently
misrepresents to another the financial condition of a third party for the
purpose of inducing him to extend credit to the third party is liable for losses
resulting from the extension of credit in reliance on the misrepresentation. 4
Misrepresentation to commercial credit rating company. One who gives
false information as to his solvency to a commercial credit rating company is
responsible to a person who relied on the misrepresentations to his detri-
ment as though he had made them directly.55
Rescission of contract. A contract may not be rescinded for fraud if
the party defrauded appears to have waived the fraud after learning the
true facts and subsequently uses the fraud as a guise for seeking recission
when in fact his real motivation was dissatisfaction with the bargain."
Proven by series of acts. "Frauds may be proven by showing a series of
distinct acts, each of which may be a badge of fraud and when taken to-
gether as a whole constitute fraud."
57
GAMING. Circumstantial Evidence. "Everyone who, like the author
[Hobson, J.], was reared and has lived all of his life in the milieu of the
deep south has a complete understanding of the reactions to arrest of an
48. Mauldin v. Reel, 56 So.2d 918 (Fla. 1952); Hilton, Forged Wills Revealed by
Scientific Examination of Documents, supra p. 560.
49. FLA. STAT. § 941.03 (1949), Hattaway v. Culbreath, 57 So.2d 661 (Fla. 1952).
50. FLA, STAT. § 72.14 (1949), Pugh v. Barwick, 56 So.2d 124 (Fla. 1952).
51. FtA. STAr. § 72.14 (1949).
52. In re Adoption of Long, 56 So.2d 450 (Fla. 1952).
53. McCormick v. Lewis, 102 F. Supp. 624 (N.D. Fla. 1952).
54. Forbes v. Auerbach, 56 So.2d 895 (Fla. 1952).
55. Ibid.
56. Nam Ian, Inc. v. Yedlin, 56 So.2d 133 (Fla. 1952).
57. Allen v. Tatham, 56 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1952).
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unlettered Negro .... His 'twisting around,' the fact that lie was 'trying
to get into his shirt' and that he evidenced a desire to go to the lavatory,
where it might be assumed that he wished to dispose of the lottery tickets,
are all normal reactions of a nescient Negro when he finds himself in the
ans of 'the law.' " Such circumstantial evidence is not sufficient to sustain
the verdict because it does not exclude every reasonable hypothesis except
that of the defendant's guilt. 8
Lottery. Evidence that the defendant was temporarily in charge of the
bar in which lottery tickets were found is not sufficient to sustain his con-
viction for unlawful possession of lottery tickets.59
Conspiring to conduct and maintain a lottery is a misdemeanor, not
a felony. One convicted of this crime should be fined or sentenced to
imprisonment in the county jail and a sentence to the state prison is
erroneous.6 0
HIGHWAYS. Intersections. A rock fill area contiguous to a highway,
which connects the pavement with a private road, is not an intersection
within the meaning of the statute prohibiting one motor vehicle from pass-
ing another on the left within 100 feet of an intersection.,'
INSURANCE. As security. Decedent assigned the proceeds from certain
insurance policies to a bank as security for any and all of his liabilities aris-
ing in the ordinary course of business. He became liable to the bank on his
own personal notes, as surety on other notes and on checks upon which his
name did not appear individually but the proceeds of which he received
directly from the bank. The court held that the bank was entitled to deduct
the amounts of all of the notes and checks before paying the balance to the
decedent's widow.
6 2
Attorney's fees. An insurance contract was entered into in a state
which had no provision for allowing attorney's fees to a beneficiary bringing
suit on his policy. The insured subsequently moved to Florida and incurred
a disability that made the insurer liable. The insurer is a foreign corporation
licensed in Florida. In a suit to recover the benefits of the policy the insured
was also allowed his attorney's fees as provided by Florida statute. 3 In a
per curiam decision, with three justices dissenting, the court held that the
Florida statute was a procedural one which added no incidents to the con-
tract. "Notwithstanding the fact that where an insurance policy is a Florida
contract, the statute, section 625.08, may be a part of the contract and,
therefore, create a substantive right in the beneficiary, such fact does not
prohibit or prevent such provision of the statute also from being a vital
58. Dixon v. State, 56 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1952).
59. Fu.. STAT. § 849.09 (1949), Broadnax v. State, 57 So.2d 651 (Fla. 1952).
60. Shuler v. State, 57 So.2d 336 (Fla. 1952).
61. FLA. STAT. § 317.30 (1949), Osborne v. Lee, 57 So.Zd 652 (Fla. 1952).
62. Silva v. Exchange Nat. Bank of Tampa, 56 So.2d 332 (Fla, 1952) (reported as
54 So.2d 370 and subsequently withdrawn by order of the court).
63. FIA. SrA'r. § 625.08 (1949).
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procedural one in the Courts of the State of Florida in any suit upon an
insurance policy where the beneficiary is successful. '6
Breach of financing arrangement. An insurer held out a solicitor of
insurance as its agent. The insurer credited unearned premiums to its general
agent who in turn paid the funds over to the insurance solicitor instead of
to the bank entitled to the funds under a policy financing arrangement. The
insurer was held liable to the bank for losses due to its failure to remit the
funds directly to the bank. It was also held that the bank was not a bene-
ficiary under the meaning of the statuteO5 allowing attorney's fees to bene-
ficiaries sueing for the proceeds of insurance policies. 0
Change of beneficiary. Insurance policy requirements for a change of
beneficiary in an ordinary life insurance policy issued to individuals are
strictly interpreted in Florida. In the absence of a reported Florida decision
directly on point it was held that the rule does not necessarily apply to a
group life insurance policy which requires nothing more of the insured than
that he notify his employer's home office of a change of beneficiary.
7
juzus. Improper communication with juror. An offer to divulge in-
fornation pertaining to the suit under consideration made to a juror by one
not a party to a suit is not a basis for a mistrial when the communication
contained no information upon which the juror could predicate a verdict."
LANDLORD AND TENANT. Implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. Unless
a lease contains an express covenant to the contrary the law will imply a
covenant of peaceable and quiet enjoyment. Should the landlord maintain
a nuisance on adjoining property he will be answerable in danages. 9
LEGISLATION. Act effective upon happening of contingency. The legis-
lature may enact a law complete in itself and provide that it shall go into
effect upon the happening of a contingency, such as the affirmative vote in
an election provided for in the act 70
LIBEL AND SLANDER. Necessary proof. It is essential to prove unprivileg-
ed publication of slanderous remarks to recover damages for slander.7'
MoRA Eccs. Effect of Divorce. A purchase money mortgage taken by
a husband and wife as mortgagees creates an estate by the entireties which
6". Feller v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the United States, 57 So.2d 581 (Fla.
1952). The dissenting opinion pointed out that the majority opinion was opposed to a
ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States [Aetna Life insurance Company v.
Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924)]and that the instant case was a violation of the "full faith
and credit" clanse of the United States Constitution.
65. PIIA. STAT. § 625.08 (1949).
66. Industrial Ins. Co. of N.J. v. First Nat. Bank of Miami, 57 So.2d 23 (Fla.
1952).
67. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Davis, 102 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Fla. 1952) (notice of the
desired change of beneficiary reached the home office of the employer on the same day
the insured died).
68. First Nat. Bank in Tarpon Springs v. Bliss, 56 So.2d 922 (Fla. 1952).
69. McClosky v. Martin, 56 So.2d 917 (Fla. 1952).
70. Gillette v. Tampa, 57 So.2d 27 (Fla. 1952).
71. Geihaus v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 194 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1952).
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becomes an estate in common upon their divorce if not otherwise disposed
of by the divorce decree.2
Foreclosure: Deficiency decree. Granting foreclosure of a chattel mort-
gage without passing on the prayer for a deficiency judgmncut does not pre-
chide the mortgagee from maintaining an action at law on the note to re-
cover the deficiency."
MUNICIPAL CORPORAtIONS. Annexation proceedings. Legislative deter-
miination that an area authorized to be annexed is a logical extension of the
boundaries of a city and amenable to municipal benefits cannot be upheld
if it constitutes a palpably arbitrary, unnecessary and flagrant invasion of
personal and property rights. The burden of establishing this rests upon
those resisting the annexation since there is a presumption in favor of the
reasonableness of the extension of the city boundaries. It is no answer to
an annexation proceeding to say that individual residents of the rural area
do not desire it if it is in the best interests of the community in which they
own property2
4
Authority of mayor to suspend city manager. Repeated suspensions of
a city manager by a mayor solely because he believes that there should be
no such office are invalid.7
Competition with private business. Authority granted a municipal cor-
poration to own an auditorium carries with it implied authority to operate it
in behalf of the public interest or economic welfare of the city, even though
such operation might compete with private business.76
Jurisdiction. Evidence which shows that the land in question is an
island unconnected by bridge with the city and that the island had rc-
ceived no municipal benefits is sufficient to divest the city of its jurisdiction
over the land.
77
Right of taxpayer to enjoin illegal acts, A taxpayer cannot sue to enjoin
aii illegal or unauthorized act of a municipal corporation unless such act
will result in an increase of his taxes or will otherwise result in direct or in-
direct pecuniary hann. Thus, where it appears that the necessary funds to
cover costs of a special election have already been collected the taxpayer may
not enjoin the election.78
NEGLIGENCE. Assumption of risk. A tenant, who was fully aware of the
slippery condition existing on one of the building's two stairways in rainy
72. Powell v..Metz, 55 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1952).
73. F.A. STAT. 702.06 (1949), McLarty v. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 57 So.2d 434
(Fla. 1952).
74. Gillette v. Tampa, 57 So.2d 27 (Fla. 1952).
75. Jones v. Slick, 56 So.2d 459 (Fla. 1952).
76. Starlight Corp. v. Mliami Beach, 57 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1952).
77. Miami Beach v. State ex rel. Wood, 56 So.2d 520 (Fla. 1952).
78. Bryan v. Miami, 56 So.2d 924 (Fla. 1952).
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weather, assumed the risk of injury by using the wet stairway and cannot
recover for injuries sustained thereby. 7"
Contributory negligence. A caddy on a golf course who is struck by a
ball driven by a player that he knew or had reason to know was an erratic
golfer might be guilty of contributory negligence in failing to be on the
lookout for a wild drive if ie knew the golfer was nearby. Failure to instruct
on contributory negligence in such a case is reversible error.8 0
Contributory negligence is a question of fact for the jury and when
the evidence shows nothing more than that the plaintiff had knowledge of
the existence of danger, the question of contributory negligence should not
be taken from the jury.81
Last-clear-chance. The last-clear-chance doctrine does not permit one
to recover in spite of his contributory negligence, but merely operates to
relieve the negligenc of the plaintiff in a particular instance which would
otherwise be regarded as contributory by its nature. This is accomplished by
characterizing the negligence of the defendant, if it intervenes between the
negligence of the plaintiff and the accident, as the sole proximate cause of
the injury. The plaintiff's antecedant negligence is then regarded as merely
a condition or as a remote cause.82
Res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may not be invoked
unless it appears that the instrumentality causing the injury was in the
exclusive control of the defendant. As a corollary, the doctrine cannot avail
if the facts are such that it could be reasonably inferred that the injury was
attributable to another. 8
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. Collateral security. An assignment of the
proceeds of insurance policies as collateral security to a bank for all liabilities
presently existing as well as those which might arise in the future is broad
enough to include such notes as the assignor may thereafter execute individu-
ally or as co-maker, those which lie has cndorsed, and checks on which lie
receives money with knowledge that therc were no funds in the drawee bank
to pay them.84-
Liability of bank to holder of check. A bank is not liable to the holder
of a check unless and until it accepts or certifies the check, notwithstanding
the fact that officers or employees of the bank verbally represented to the
holder that the drawer's account was good when it fact it was not. 5
PROCEDURE. Appeal and error. On appeal it is the order that is rc-
79. Atlantic Terrace Co. v. Rosen, 56 So.2d 444 (Fla. 1952).
80. Miller v. Rollings, 56 So.2d 137 (Fla. 1951).
81. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Gary, 57 So.2d 10 (F~a. 1952).
82. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Martin, 56 So.2d 509 (Fla. 1952).
83. Schott v. Pancoast Properties, 57 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1952).
84. Silva v. Exchange Bank of Tampa, 56 So.2d 332 (Fla. 1952) (reported as 54
So.2d 370 and subsequently withdrawn by order of the court).
85. FLA. STAT. § 676.52 (1949), Gartner v. American Nat. Bank of Jacksonville, 56
So.2d 529 (Fla. 1952).
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viewed and ruled on rather than the reasons assigned or set out in the order.80
After the entry of an order of dismissal the circuit court still has juris-
diction of the matter for six months, during which time the plaintiff may
file a petition showing good cause to set aside the order and reinstate the
cause. The aggrieved party should follow this procedure and an appeal of
the dismissal filed before final judgment is premature.87
In a tort action against two defendants a judgment was had against one
and a verdict of not guilty against the other. The defendant against whom
judgment was had filed an appeal. Plaintiff then filed notice of joinder of
the defendant who had been found not guilty at trial. This defendant ob-
jected on the ground that the plaintiff had not paid the costs in the trial
court as required by statute. 8 The court held that this statute was inapplic-
able in the present case since the plaintiff had not incurred any costs in the
court below, having won the suit. 9
In a proceeding for a declaratory judgment pertaining to the propriety
of limitations imposed by the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission in
issuing a certificate of public convenience and necessity to a railroad the
chancellor stated in his final decree, "It is not contended in the instant case
that the statutory requisites entitling applicant to a certificate have not been
met." The court held it too late to raise the question of a proper application
for the certificate in the appellate briefs.Y0
Review by certiorari does not ordinarily extend to a consideration of the
probative force of the conflicting testimony of two groups of witnesses."
Declaration. A declaration for wrongful death under the statute 2 does
not require intricate wording. Words charging the defendant with being
negligently responsible for the death of the decedent are sufficient. 3
Discovery. The defendant in a criminal prosecution stemning from an
automobile accident secured the permission of the court to have an experi-
cnced court reporter transcribe the testimony. The defendant paid the re-
porter, who was not acting in his official capacity and was not sworn. In a
subsequent action against the defendant for injuries sustained in the same
accident, the plaintiffs sought an order requiring the defendant to deliver a
copy of the transcript of the criminal proceedings. It was held that the
plaintiffs were not entitled to receive the transcript in such circumstances.
4
Habeas corpus. The rule that a petitioner must have exhausted his
remedy in the state courts before seeking a writ of habeas corpus in the
86. Perkins v. Coral Gables, 57 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1952).
87. FLA. STAT. § 45.12 (1949), National Surety Corp. v. Grahn, 57 So.2d 457
(F1a. 1952).
88. FLA. STAT. § 59.09 (1949).
89. FLA. STAT. c. 30 (1949), Fla. Sup. Ct. Rule 13, Thomas Awning Co. v.
Morgan, 57 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1952).
90. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Mack, 57 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1952).
91. Schott v. Brooks, 56 So.2d 456 (Fla. 1952).
92. FLA. STAT. § 440.39 (1949).
93. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Gary, 57 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1952).
94. McGee v. Cohen, 57 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1952).
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federal courts is subject to an exception in unusual circumstances. Such
unusual circumstances exist when a person convicted of manslaughter four
years ago has twice appealed to the Florida Supreme Court,",- been denied
certiorari once by the United States Supreme Court,"' sought a writ of
habeas corpus in the state court"7 and is still awaiting final disposition before
serving his sentence. "
New trial. When a properly instructed jury returns a verdict based on
sufficient evidence to support its findings it is error for a trial judge to
grant a new trial when nothing can be accomplished except to have another
jury review the cause. "Courts are not permitted to pit their judgment
against that of a jury sworn to try the cause.'"Il
Once a trial judge has determined that a verdict is contrary to the
weight of evidence he is under a duty to order a new trial.""
Remittitur. A successful plaintiff who files a remittitur rather than
face a new trial cannot be heard to complain of error with reference to the
order to remit on appeal of the defendant's motion for a new trial. In the
words of the court, he cannot "have his cake and eat it too."'
0'
Sham plea. A plea of no consideration in a suit on a promissory note
may properly be stricken as a sham if the defendant fails to answer the
plaintiff's affidavit with a counter-affidavit.102
Summary judgment. When the record fails to rcvcal a genuine issue
as to any material fact a summary judgment is correctly entered. 0 3
Vacation or modification of judgment by trial court. "All judgmcnts,
decrees or other orders of the Court, however conclusive their character, arc
under the control of the Court which pronounced them during the terin at
which they are rendered, or entered of record, and they may be set aside,
vacated, modified, or annulled by that Court. . . . After the term has elided
all final judgments and decrees of the Court pass beyond its control, unless
steps are taken during the term, by motion or otherwise, to set aside, modify
or correct thcni. Orders, decrees or judgments made through fraud, collu-
sion, deceit or mistake may be opened or vacated or modified at any time
on the proper showing made by the parties injured."''"
Waiver of jury trial. A motion to strike a portion of the defendant's
answer coupled with a motion for summary judgment is tantamount to a
waiver of the movant's request for a jury trial in the initial pleadings.)
95. State v. Baeoin, 159 Fla. 54, 30 So.2d 744 (1947); Bacom v. State, 39 So.2d
794 (Fla. 1949).
96. Bacomn v. State, 338 U.S. 835 (1949).
97. Bacomn v. Sullivan, 51 So.2d 189 (EFla. 1950).
98. Baeorn v. Sullivan, 194 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1952),
99. 'oindexter v. Seaboard Air Line R.R. 56 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1952).
100. Richbourg v. Hilton. 56 So.2d 539 (Fla. 1952).
101. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Martin, 56 So.2d 509 (Fla. 1952).
102. Sarasota Kennel Club, Inc. v. Shea, 56 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1952).
103. Goodman v. Miami Beach Ry. Co., 57 So.2d 445 (Vla. 1952).
104. VIA. STAT. §§ 26.36, 50.10 (1949), Perrin v. Enos, 56 So.2d 920 (Fla. 1952).
105. Silva v. Exchange Nat. Bank of Tanipa, 56 So.2d 332 (Fla. 1952) (reported as
54 So.2d 370 and subsequently withdrawn by order of the court).
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Writ of prohibition. An appeal and not a writ of prohibition is the
proper way to review errors of a circuit court. A petition for a writ of pro-
hibition should affirmatively show either a lack of jurisdiction in an inferior
court or that the inferior court exceeded its jurisdiction.' 01
PUBLIC HEALTII. Tubercular persons. The statute requiring compul-
sory isolation and hospitalization of tubercular persons'017 is a proper exercise
of police power and is not violative of constitutional rights. The fact that
the statute does not provide for any definite or mandatory form of release
does not invalidate it. When the person hospitalized feels that he has been
cured or the disease is no longer infectious the courts will be open to him
to obtain his release.'
REAL PROPERTY. Easement of necessity. The right to a way of neces-
sity is founded upon an implied grant from a common grantor in the chain
of title. No such implication arises from conveyances by the State. The
statutory exception to this rule allows a way of necessity only to land-
locked property used for home, agriculture or stock raising but for no other
purposes.'"
Loss of homestead classification. A man married and brought his bride
to live in his father's home. Subsequently the son actively assumed the role
of head of the family domiciled in that home. The court held that the
property lost its homestead character under these circumstances even
though the father-owner continued to live on the property.110
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. Memorandum. A letter from a father to his
daughter promising to convey a half interest in his property to her if she
would come to live with him is not a sufficient memorandum to satisfy the
Statute of Frauds."'
Part performance. Taking possession of land in addition to the pay-
ment of a part or all of the consideration is such part performance as will
take an oral contract for the sale of the land out of the Statute of Frauds."
2
STATUTES. Plurality of subjects. A legislative act creating a court of
record and abolishing a county court does not contain two different matters
so disconnected and dissimilar as to constitute an unconstitutional plurality
of subiects.
1 '
TAXATION. Drainage districts. "Lack of benefits cannot form a de-
fense to or the means of attack on tax liability to a drainage district under a
statute providing that the taxes are for a special benefit to the lands involved
106. State ex rel. Dunscombe v. Smith, 56 So.2d 536 (Fla. 1952).
107. FLA. STAT. § 392.23(2) (1949).
108. Moore v. Draper, 57 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1952).
109. Guess v. Azar, 57 So.2d 443 (Fla. 1952).
110. Brady v. Brady, 55 So.2d 907 (Fla. 1950), aff'd on rehearing, Dec. 4, 1951.
111. Cottages, Miami Beach, Inc., v. Wegman, 57 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1952).
112. Ibid.
113. FLA, CONsT. Art. III, § 16, Hanson v. State, 56 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1952).
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unless ]ere is a clear showing of abuse of discretion on the part of the
Legislature."" 4
Improvement assessments. The court had formerly held that "lands
which were benefitted or were reasonably susceptible to benefits by their
inclusion within the city limits and by the expansion program for which
the bond funds were to be expended" might in equity be "assessed upon a
just and uniform basis for their proportionate share of the debt.'' 1 1, In
clarification of this rule the court said: "By this we meant, and now hold,
that such lands should be assessed for taxes in accordance with the statutory
law and constitutional provisions of this State upon the subject of taxation
and in the same manner that all other real property liable to such tax is
taxed."''6
There is a presumption in favor of the validity of improvement assess-
ments by a municipality and a party attacking the assessments must sustain
the burden of proving that no benefits would accrue to the property
assessed.'
Special school tax districts. The legislature may create elementary or
high school tax areas for the purpose of imposing a tax for public school
purposes, so long as the tax imposed, when added to that already imposed
by existing special school districts, does not exceed the constitutional limita-
tion of ten mills.
1l8
State property. "A state clearly has the right, by positive legislative
enactment, to declare that its property may be assessed for local improve-
ments, and a constitutional exemption of the property of the state from
'taxation""' does not prevent such a grant." A subsequent act providing
that no taxes shall be levied on any land comprising part of the State School
Fund' 0 is ineffectual to overcome the previous grant of authority to levy
special assessments for improvements.''
Toars. Assault. Allegations that plaintiff as discharged fromu employ-
ment and threatened with forcible eviction from the premises are insuffi-
cient to state a cause of action for assault.'
--
Liability of county hospital to paying patient. As to paying patients a
county hospital is operated in a proprietary capacity. The paying patient is
entitled to the same protection and the same redress for wrongs that he
would receive in a privately owned hospital. He may not be divested of this
114. State ex rel. Board of Sup'rs of S, a. GonserNaicy Dist. v. Warren, 57 So.2d
337 (Fla. 1952).
115. Town of Largo v. Caraher, 44 So.2d 84 (Fla. 1950).
116. Town of i-owey in the Hills v. Craessle, 57 So.2d 422 (Fla. 1952).
117. Rosche v. Hollywood, 55 So.2d 509 (Fla. 1952).
118. FLA. CoNsr. Art. XII, § 10, Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26775, Smith v. Board of Pub.
Inst. of Brevard County, 56 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1952).
119. FLA. CoNsr. Art. XVI, § 16.
120. Fla. Laws 1949, c. 25186.
121. State ex rel. Board of Sup'rs of S. Fla. Conservancy Dist. v. Warren, 57 So.2d
337sFla. 1952)A12.Gelhaus v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 194 F.2d 774 (5gth Cir. 1952).
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right by an act' 3 immunizing the hospital from liability for the acts of
its agents and employees.
124
Malicious prosecution. False testimony given by the defendant as
prosecuting witness in a criminal action against the plaintiff is sufficient to
justify a jury finding of the necessary malice to support a suit for malicious
prosecution. 125
Statutory liability for dog bite. An easily readable sign bearing the
words "Beware of Dogs" suffices to relieve the owner of a dog from liability
to a party bitten on the owner's premises, although the statute requires the
words "Bad Dog." 12 0
TRUSTS. Constructive trust. A person obtaining title to land by fraud
cannot be placed in a better position than he would have been had the
fraud not been committed. Therefore, once a fraud is established, it is
error to declare a constructive trust of only half the land in favor of the
party defrauded.
2 1
Cy pres. In applying the doctrine of cy pres a public body such as a
county board of public instruction may be properly submitted as the bene-
ficiarv of a charitable trust created for the purpose of providing adequate
vocational education to the Negroes of the State.
28
Establishment of resulting trust by parol evidence. "When a resulting
trust is sought to be established by parol evidence, the burden rests upon
the person asserting the existence of the trust to remove every reasonable
doubt as to its existence by clear, strong and unequivocal evidence." 
1 20
USURY. Criminal and civil. It is the rule that if a note contains an
acceleration clause of which the lender takes advantage the bonus or excess
will be prorated only over the period of time which the lender has elected
to allow the obligation to run.23 0  However, this rule will not be applied
to make a note, which was only civilly usurious in its inception, criminally
usurious when the lender sues only for the amount lent and not for the
bonUs.
13
'WILLS. Effect of divorce. A separation agreement between husband
aiid wife followed by a divorce does not impliedly revoke a provision in her
favor in the husband's will.
132
Petition for distribution. Petitioners, one of whom was a minor rep-
resented by his guardian, petitioned to have executed an agreed plan of dis-
tribution of an intestate estate. The court held that the agreed plan of
123. Fla. Laws 1945, c. 23547.
124. Suwannee County Hospital Corp, v, Golden, 56 So.2d 911 (Fla. 1952).
125. Maiborne v, Kuntz, 56 So,2d 720 (Fla. 1952).
126. FLA. STAT. § 767.04 (1949), Romfh v. Berman. 56 So.2d 127 (Fla. 1952).
127. Allen v, Tatham, 56 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1952).
128. Fenske v. Coddington, 57 So.2d 452 (Fla. 1952).
129. Pringle v. Pringle, 57 So.2d 429 (Ha. 1952).
130. Smith v. Midcoast hiw. Co., 127 Fla. 455, 173 So. 348 (1937).
131. FLA. STAT. §§ 687.03, 687.04, 687.07, Arvvas v. Green, 57 So.2d 30 (Fla. 1952).
132. Davis v. Davis, 57 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1952).
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distribution could not be approved since it was not obviously serving the
best interests of the minor child.' 33
Presumption of revocation. There is a rebuttable presumption that a
testator revoked his will if it was known to have been in his possession and
cannot be found subsequent to his death.
1 4
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. Mental injury caused by fright. An em-
ployee was involved in a traffic accident in the course of his employment
and sought to recover workmen's compensation. His only provable injury is
a mental or nervous condition. The court held that there was no excep-
tion to the statute which precludes recovery for a mental or nervous injury
due to fright or excitement only, as distinguished from a similar condition
brought on by trauma.'
3 5
Reopening of case. Evidence that does nothing more than add to or
controvert that already taken is not sufficient to reopen a case for the pur-
pose of securing additional workmen's compensation. It must reveal new or
changed developments that have a casual relationship to the injury to war-
rant a reopening of the case.' 36
Statute of Limitations. The legislature expressed only one exception
to the two year Statute of Limitations in the Florida Workmen's Compen-
sation Act.""7 The maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius ("express
mention of one thing is the exclusion of another"), is applicable and no
other exceptions will be implied.' 8
Zoning. Conflict with statute. If two city zoning ordinances, when
construed together, can only be interpreted to mean that but one liquor
license may be issued within an incorporated area, they are void as being
in conflict with the statute prohibiting license limitations which prevent
the issuance of less than two such licenses in any incorporated area. 139
133. In To Beach's Estate, 57 So.2d 659 (Fla. 1952).
134. In re Washington's Estate, 56 Sold 545 (Fla. 1952).
135. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(19) (1949), City Ice & Fuel Division v. Smith, 56 So.2d
329 (Fla 1952).
136. McDonough v. Versailles Hotel, 57 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1952); Sonny Boy's Fruit
Co. v. Compton, 46 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1951).
137. FLA. STAT. § 440.19(1) (1949).
138. Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1952).
139. FLA. STAT. § 561.20(1) (1949), Downsbrough v. Town of Lake Maitland, 57
So.2d 21 (Fia. 1952).
